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Ball, Bat and Bar
Harold Seymour*
M OST AMERICANS AssuME that they live under one set of laws
which govern everybody. They also think that while
monopolies and their abuses were once a problem, regulatory
measures have long since eliminated or controlled them. The
business of organized baseball proves that both these assump-
tions are mistaken. Recent operations of some baseball "com-
panies" have underscored the falsity of these assumptions.
The baseball business operates under its own complicated
body of private law, and has been doing so ever since the busi-
ness got its real start with the formation of the National League
in 1876. Organized baseball is also a monopoly which has long
ignored the anti-trust laws and continues to do so with impunity.
Its pretense to be a "sport" has become farcical.
The salient facts about the dimensions and operational meth-
ods of this commercialized amusement business reveal its mo-
nopolistic nature and the methods it uses to enforce its fiat. Or-
ganized baseball consists of a vast conglomeration of approxi-
mately 243 professional baseball clubs, organized into two eight-
club major leagues and about 28 minor leagues; a far-flung net-
work extending throughout the United States and into several
foreign countries. Its economic importance is very considerable.
Total annual receipts are in the neighborhood of one hundred
million dollars. About 10,000 players, besides an enormous num-
ber of other men and women, are employed, and over 50,000,000
people attend 30,000 "games" every year.'
The sale of the Detroit American League club, for more than
five million dollars in 1956, is another measure of its economic
proportions.2
This combine of clubs and leagues is governed by several
major documents: the constitutions of the two major leagues;
* A.B., Drew Univ.; MA. and Ph.D. in History, Cornell Univ., with doctorate
dissertation on baseball; author of a forthcoming scholarly history of the
game; formerly Director of Information Services at Univ. of Buffalo; now
Professor of History, Finch College; former Exec. V. P. of Cleveland Better
Business Bureau; former Professor of History, Fenn College; baseball ex-
perience ranging from Batboy for the Brooklyn Dodgers to college player,
coach and scout for the Boston Red Sox; author of many articles for his-
tory, education and other publications; etc.
1 A convenient source for this kind of statistics is The Baseball Blue Book,
published annually by Heilbroner's Baseball Bureau at Fort Wayne, In-
diana.
2 Sporting News (St. Louis), July 18, 1956.
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the Major League Agreement and Major League Rules, binding
the two majors together; the National Association Agreement,
regulating the minor leagues; and the Major-Minor League
Agreement and Major-Minor League Rules, tieing together the
two major and all the minor leagues. These agreements are ad-
ministered by a so-called Commissioner, assisted by an Executive
Council.
3
Whether or not this combine is big business is a matter of
relativity. Compared with General Motors it is small indeed,
but on the other hand it is certainly no neighborhood cigar store
operation. Club owners, when they concede that they are en-
gaged in a business, plead its smallness. But one of them let the
cat out of the bag back in 1951, during their squabble with Happy
Chandler, who was then Commissioner. He said: "We can't have
a commissioner who makes too many mistakes. We have a big
investment in this business. Baseball is big business." Chandler's
reply is equally revealing: "Big business, huh? That shows the
kind of stupid men I've had to deal with in baseball. For years
I have tried to protect baseball from the label of big business in
Washington. I steered them to favorable decisions from the
courts and the Federal Communications Commission because I
could plead we weren't big business. If they want a commissioner
for their big business, they'll get one-but he'll be under Federal
Government supervision, and subject to all the regulations and
restrictions of all other big business. They ought to think about
that when they call baseball big business. I always regarded it as
our National Game that belonged to 150 million men, women and
children, not to 16 special people who happen to own big league
teams." 4
Any evaluation of the economic significance of organized
baseball must go beyond the limits of the industry itself and take
into consideration numerous auxiliary enterprises, such as the
concession business, advertising, sporting goods, transportation,
hotels, restaurants, newspapers, and magazines. No business in
America gets as much free space in the newspapers as does
baseball. Practically every business in any given community has
a direct or indirect stake in the local baseball club, and therefore
a vested interest in promoting "loyalty" to and enthusiasm for
the local nine---or, in the absence of a team, trying to secure one.
3 The Little Red Book of Major League Baseball (Boston), published an-
nually.
4 Quoted in Sporting News, March 21, 1951.
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A recent survey showed that getting a major league baseball
club increased business in Milwaukee by more than 25 million
dollars, including restaurants ($2,007,449.73), retail stores ($1,-
632,951.34), night clubs ($939,265.47), miscellaneous items ($791,-
929.71), hotels ($110,501.82).5
The cash nexus as related to baseball was clearly shown by
the New York Board of Trade late in the season of 1955, when it
sent a telegram exhorting Casey Stengel, Yankee manager, to
win the pennant because a subway World Series with the Dodgers
"will bring many visitors to New York and thereby stimulate
store sales, hotel reservations and travel accommodations."
Clinching the pennant, Stengel was told, would "bring happiness
and cheer to all New York businessmen." 6
The business realities of this so-called "sport" were even
more plainly exposed in the recent efforts of Los Angeles and
San Francisco to lure the Giants and Dodgers away from New
York. The Giants definitely are leaving New York for San
Francisco, making little pretense that "sport" is even one of their
considerations in so doing. The Dodgers are still chaffering for
the most lucrative offer, at this writing. President Abe Stark of
New York's City Council accused the mayors of the West Coast
cities of "organized piracy," saying that he "deeply resented" the
"unsportsmanlike attack" in "attempting to take business away
from New York." The San Francisco mayor, George Christopher,
was equally statesmanlike in his reply: "If I can steal the Giants
away from New York, I will do it" 7-and he succeeded, too.
Theodore Roosevelt knew what he was talking about when he
said, "When money comes in at the gate, sport flies out at the
window."
Cities rush to give away tax-free assets, at their taxpayers'
expense, to get a team. The legality of such gifts is at least
questionable. This is compulsory support of the club, by all
taxpayers.
Organized baseball uses a number of restrictive practises in
order to maintain its monopoly. 8 They may be divided into two
broad categories-those governing its employees (the players),
and those controlling the consumer market. The industry has
5 Ibid., May 22, 1957. Also see William B. Furlong, That "Big League"
Yearning, New York Times Magazine, June 16, 1957, pp. 14, 16.
6 Cleveland Press, September 10, 1955.
7 Sporting News, May 29, 1957.
8 The organizational and administrative structure of organized baseball is
set forth in the major documents governing the game, mentioned above.
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established a monopsony (buyers' monopoly) control over its
manpower; that is, the employers have agreed not to compete
for the services of the players. This control is established through
use of a uniform contract! throughout organized baseball. All
material points of this contract, regardless of league or classifica-
tion, are the same, and the only subject of negotiation between
a club and a player is the matter of compensation.
Most important, every contract contains the much-debated
"reserve clause," an ingenious device which gives the club a
continuing option on the services of the player and protects its
property rights in him. Therefore when a player signs his first
contract in organized baseball, he is in reality signing for the
duration of his baseball career, because he not only agrees to
perform for the period specified (usually one season), but allows
the club to "reserve" him for the subsequent season. Since each
succeeding contract which he signs contains the same provision,
he cannot escape. The club can terminate the agreement upon
thirty days' notice, or can assign the contract to another club,
but the player cannot perform for any other team unless his
contract has been assigned or he has been released. By signing
with one club, the player surrenders his freedom ever again to
bargain with and sell his services to the highest bidder in the
baseball marketplace. Once in organized baseball, if a player
refuses to sign his contract, or ignores the reserve rule, no other
club will employ him. He must either come to terms with his
particular club or quit his profession. To enforce the contract,
organized baseball uses extra-legal methods, including fines and
the blacklist. The reserve clause, introduced in 1879, was origi-
nally a secret agreement among owners to hold down salaries
by agreeing not to compete for the services of five designated
players on each team. Realizing the advantage of such an ar-
rangement, the owners not only extended the reserve until it in-
cluded all players, but they also used it as a weapon in trade
wars with rival leagues, banning reserved players who joined
competitors.
Another important factor in organized baseball's labor re-
lations is its system of vertical concentration, more commonly
known as the "farm system," which enables the major league
clubs to control possibly as much as 90% of the supply of pro-
fessional players, and hence the careers of these men. Either by
9 Uniform Player's Contract, American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs. Sample copy in author's personal files.
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outright ownership or through various agreements with minor
league clubs, a parent major league club may control hundreds
of players at one time,10 keeping them in cold storage with the
reserve clause, either to be used later as replacements for the
big league club, or just to prevent rival clubs from getting them.
To be sure, there are mitigating factors in this situation, such as
the draft rule and the waiver rule, but these are largely ineffec-
tive and commonly circumvented, so that a big league club can
keep a promising player under cover by one means or another
for at least seven years, even though he might be good enough
to be playing with another major league team."
There is no collective bargaining in the baseball business.
Four major attempts at unionization in the course of baseball's
history have all met with failure. At present, there is a players'
representation plan under which they may petition the owners
for changes, but the owners are free to accept or reject the re-
quests. In recent years, the major league owners have granted
some important concessions, such as a minimum salary, limita-
tion on salary cuts, expense money during spring training, and
a pension plan. But these have come out of fear of competition
from the Mexican League, the threat of a players' union, and
pressure from the Justice Department.
Other restrictive practises employed by organized baseball
establish a monopoly of consumer markets. Ever since the busi-
ness was established, it has divided the consumer markets by
giving each club "territorial rights" over the area in which it
operates. The idea was to prevent several clubs from competing
in one city and consequently having attendance spread so thin
among them that none could keep out of the red. Territorial
rights limit the number of exhibitions given and the customer's
choice of those he will see. The system also makes it possible for
clubs to fix admission prices.
Territorial rights also make it virtually impossible for out-
siders to enter the baseball business. In instances where they
have tried, they have been branded "outlaw" by organized base-
ball. Bitter trade wars have ensued, in which organized baseball
fought with boycotts, blacklists, bidding up player salaries, and
10 Sporting News, July 3, 1957.
11 Organized Baseball; Report of the Subcommittee on the Study of Monop-
oly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report, No. 2002, 82d
Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1952), pp. 144-156, 158.
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court action; resulting either in the destruction of the rival group
or its merger with organized baseball.' 2
Not only can each major league club veto the entrance of a
rival club into its territory, but it is also prevented from moving
its own franchise to another city without the unanimous consent
of the clubs in its own league and a majority approval of those in
the other major league. As a result, the major leagues have not
kept abreast of the great population shifts which have been
taking place in America. The alignment of their clubs remained
the same for half a century after being set up in 1903, and it
was not until 1953 that the mold was broken with the shift of
the Boston National League team to Milwaukee. As a result of
this rigidity, clubs fortunate enough to be located in lucrative
cities prospered, while those stuck with smaller ones did not.
The disparity in financial resources was reflected in the caliber
of their teams. So a system supposedly established "to preserve
and stimulate competition for the League pennants" 13 has had
the opposite effect.
Organized baseball has frequently been piously equated with
democracy, or at least pointed to as a symbol of it. As a news-
paper columnist once expressed it, "You would think that the
Declaration of Independence carried a complete set of baseball
rules as a postscript." 14
During World War I, John K. Tener, then President of the
National League, asserted: "This is a war of democracy against
bureaucracy. And I tell you that baseball is the very watchword
of democracy. There is no other sport or business or anything
under heaven which exerts the leveling influence that baseball
does. Neither the public school nor the church can approach it.
Baseball is unique. England is a democratic country, but it lacks
the finishing touch of baseball." 15
More recently, Commissioner Ford Frick said that baseball
exemplified the Bill of Rights because of its freedom of assembly,
religion, speech, and opportunity. 16 There is much to be said for
12 See, for example, Harold Seymour, St. Louis and the Union Baseball
War, 51 Missouri Historical Review, 257-269 (Kirksville, Missouri, April,
1957).
13 Major League Rules, 1C, in, Organized Baseball; Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, House of Representatives, Serial No. 1, Part 6, 82d Congress, 1st Ses-
sion (Washington, 1952), p. 1125.
14 Cleveland Press, October 5, 1950.
15 19 Baseball Magazine, 227 (Boston, May, 1917).
16 Speech, November 10, 1951, before the City Club, Cleveland, Ohio.
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Frick's contention, as far as it applies to the atmosphere on the
playing field and in the ball park, and to the opportunities for
young men trying to become professional players-especially
after baseball erased the color line which it had maintained for
decades. But the Commissioner neglected to point out that the
organization and economic structure of the game is anything but
democratic. Its restrictive labor practises and monopolistic divi-
sion and control of consumer markets are hardly in keeping with
traditional American belief in freedom of individual opportunity,
free enterprise, and competition. They do not square with the
American ideas that people should be free to work for whom
they please, offer their services to the highest bidder, and enter
any business they wish.
What has been the position of the courts with respect to
organized baseball? 17 The key case, of course, is Federal Base-
ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200 (1922), in which Justice Holmes ruled
that the business of giving baseball exhibitions for profit was
not "trade or commerce in the commonly-accepted use of those
words," because "personal effort, not related to production, is
not a subject of commerce"; nor was it inter-state, because the
movement of clubs across state lines was merely "incidental" to
the business. It should be noted that, contrary to what many
believe, Holmes did call baseball a business. Time and again
those who have not bothered to read the text of Holmes's decision
have claimed that he said that baseball was a sport and not a
business; or in discussing the baseball business they often intro-
duce a note of doubt with the qualifying phrase, "if it is a
business."
Lately, much has been heard of the comfortable cliche that
baseball is too much of a sport to be a business and too much
of a business to be a sport.18 Actually, the professional end of it
is not a sport at all. Sport means participation in an activity
for its own sake-for the sheer pleasure and recreation one
derives from it. Professional ball players, as one of them once
pointed out, are first of all businessmen. 19 Some have even in-
corporated themselves. Their primary reason for playing is to
17 Of the scholarly articles on this subject, probably the best and most
comprehensive is Peter S. Craig, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Base-
ball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 Yale L. J., 576-639 (1953).
18 Attributed originally to Phillip K. Wrigley, Jr., President of the Chicago
National League Club.
19 Grover Cleveland Alexander, cited in John R. Tunis, $port$, Heroics,
and Hysterics, p. 5 (New York, 1928).
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get their pay checks and maybe the world series pot of gold.
Furthermore, the ethic of the professional game is anything but
sporting. It condones taking all one can get under the rules and
a little bit more. Arguing and brawling with opposing players
and umpires are part of the struggle for victory. The role of the
spectators is basically passive. Their thrills are vicarious. Other
than using their lung power, about the only exercise they get is
on the seat of their pants.
All this is not to say that professional baseball is not a good
thing, or does not have any beneficial attributes. To the con-
trary, a lengthy catalogue in its favor could easily be prepared.
But it should not be regarded as a sport any more than any
other entertainment business, professionalized college football
included.
If the Holmes interpretation ever made sense, it soon was
completely discredited by changes in the Supreme Court's view
of the criteria of interstate commerce, and by changes in pro-
fessional baseball itself, such as its use of radio and TV in pro-
moting the game across interstate lines. Nevertheless, organized
baseball sheltered safely under the Holmes decision until 1949,
when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (C. C. A. 2, 1949), upheld the com-
plaint of a player blacklisted by organized baseball for jumping
to the then "outlaw" Mexican League in response to a higher
bid for his services. In this case Judge Frank called the Holmes
decision an "impotent zombie" and the reserve clause monopo-
listic. But organized baseball staved off further difficulty by
settling the Gardella case and that of another player, Stuart
Martin, out of court.
Several years later the Supreme Court, in Toolson v. N. Y.
Yankees, 346 U. S. 356 (1953) rehearing denied, 346 U. S. 917
(1953), turned down an appeal from the lower courts as follows:
"Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments
below are affirmed on the authority" of the Federal Baseball case
"so far as that decision determines that Congress had no inten-
tion of including the business of baseball within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws." Justices Burton and Reed dissented.
This denial also included two other similar cases.
This year the relation between the Supreme Court and or-
ganized baseball was climaxed, oddly, by the court's decision in
a football case, Radovich v. National Football League, 25 L. W.
4152 (U. S., 1957). The court held against professional football,
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss3/15
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deciding that it came within the jurisdiction of the antitrust
laws. Apparently feeling the need to explain why professional
baseball was not treated the same, the court said:
"In Toolson we continued to hold the umbrella over
baseball that was placed there some 31 years earlier by
Federal baseball. The Court did this because it was con-
cluded that more harm would be done in overruling Federal
baseball than in upholding a ruling which at best was of
dubious validity. Vast efforts had gone into the develop-
ment and organization of baseball since that decision and
enormous capital had been invested in reliance on its per-
manence. All this, combined with the flood of litigation that
would follow its repudiation, the harassment that would
ensue, and the retroactive effect of such a decision, led the
Court to the practical result that it should sustain the un-
equivocal line of authority stretching over rany years ...
were we considering the question of baseball for the first
time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts"-that
baseball should come under the antitrust laws.
This placed the court in the seemingly absurd position of,
first, discriminating against one professional sport as against
another; second, admitting that the Holmes decision was an
error; and third, compounding the error by upholding it, purely
on the basis of expediency.
This anomaly should give pause to those who always con-
tend that we live under a government of laws, not of men-
always, that is, until the Supreme Court upsets them with
decisions like the recent ones upholding fundamental American
civil rights. The work of the Court in these baseball cases should
dispel any doubt that laws must necessarily be interpreted by
men. It should make plain that the Supreme Court justices do
not dwell on Mount Olympus in lofty objectivity, handing down
decisions coldly, dispassionately, and impersonally. The baseball
decisions demonstrate what has been shown in countless past
instances-that the Supreme Court justices interpret the law in
the light of their own knowledge, background, and experience,
and in keeping with the climate of opinion which prevails at the
time.
What, then, is the prospect for organized baseball and the
antitrust laws, now that the Supreme Court has, in effect, handed
the problem over to Congress? 20 Undoubtedly, changes will be
made. The question is, what will they be? There are three
20 For a good brief summary of the current situation, see report of Spencer
M. Beresford, American Law Division, Library of Congress, published in
the Congressional Record, Wednesday, July 3, 1957, p. A5325.
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broad possibilities: Congress can exempt baseball from the
antitrust laws; it can place the business under them; or it can
take the middle ground of partial application of the laws.
Baseball executives and their supporters in Congress want
their blanket exemption continued. It is doubtful if they will
succeed in getting it. Organized baseball has some very obvious
abuses. The Commissioner and the owners admitted as much
when they appointed Committees to re-examine the structure of
the business, following the Congressional investigation of 1951.
How much progress will be made as a result remains to be seen.
Baseball's past history reveals little evidence of the owners'
ability to police themselves. And even if they did succeed in
cleaning their own house, it is still doubtful that they should
have immunity. There would be no assurance that such benevo-
lent self-regulation would continue. Giving special dispensation
to professional baseball would probably also open the way for
other types of business to plead for similar special privileges.
As far as that goes, the goodness or badness of the baseball
monopoly is beside the point. The issue is whether it is legal
or illegal. Judge Frank was getting at this point in his reply to
former baseball Commissioner Chandler's comment that "No
major leaguer makes less than $5000 a year 2' and some make up
to $100,000. If you call that peonage, then a lot of us would like
to be in on it"; 22 to which Judge Frank answered, "Only the
totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual
slavery." 23
On the other hand, it is equally unlikely that Congress will
invoke the antitrust laws and compel baseball to engage in free
competition. While it is true that almost any business can claim
unique features, nevertheless organized baseball does have dis-
tinct peculiarities. It sells baseball games, but to do so the con-
testants must approximate each other in skill. People would
scarcely pay to see the champion New York Yankees play a
sandlot team. No single owner can market the product by him-
self; he must market it in conjunction with his fellows. There-
fore the major league club owners are not only competitors, they
are at the same time partners who must cooperate with each
other to a much greater degree than in conventional business
enterprises.
21 Increased to $6000 in 1954.
22 Jay H. Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 58 Yale L. J., 694 (1949).
23 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (C. C. A. 2, 1949).
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To achieve this competitive balance, the owners and their
supporters argue, restrictive measures like the reserve clause,
territorial rights, and the farm system are essential. The argu-
ments for and against these measures are many, and they have
been urged from time to time ever since the devices were in-
stituted. Although there are some who maintain that the reserve
clause could be eliminated without destroying the business, the
preponderance of opinion among those who have studied the
problem is that the reserve is necessary, but with modifications
and safeguards set up to eliminate its abuses. Advocacy of base-
ball's other restrictive practises is less vehement, although the
Commissioner has claimed that territorial rights are essential;
and Branch Rickey, who perfected the farm system, has upheld
its merits.24 The consensus of belief, therefore, is that the cure
would be worse than the disease. Invoking the antitrust laws
would either destroy the business or alter it so greatly as to make
it unrecognizable.
Aside from these considerations, Congress is apt to go slow,
because organized baseball has a strong hold on the emotions of
the American people. Although it was derived from English
rounders, baseball has long been regarded as the American
National Game, much as cricket is associated with England, and
it has become an important institution in our society.25 Con-
gressmen realize this, and will gauge possible repercussions in
the ballot-box before taking any extreme measures. As far as
that goes, governments have never succeeded in curbing really
popular amusements. As long ago as the second century B. C.,
gambling was forbidden in India, but was never stamped out;
and the mime flourished in Rome despite the opposition of the
Church and the Emperor.26
The chances are, therefore, that the middle course will be
taken. Baseball will be given limited exemption. The antitrust
laws will be applied to the business except for those practices and
restrictions deemed necessary to its successful operation. In
spite of itself, the business of organized baseball will probably
be pulled out of the industrial Middle Ages and brought closer
to the economic practices of mid-twentieth century America.
24 House Report, pp. 190, 69.
25 See Harold Seymour, How Baseball Began, 50 The New-York HL'torical
Society Quarterly, 369-385 (New York, October, 1956).
26 14 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 305-308 (New York, 1934).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
